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Determinants of Firms’ Capital Structure Decisions in Highly Dollarized 
Economies: Evidence from Cambodia 
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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the features and determinants of capital structure decisions 
of firms in an almost completely dollarized credit market using survey-based data collected by 
the National Bank of Cambodia and JICA Research Institute in 2014. Specifically, we estimate 
the determinants of the ratio of bank loans to total assets, using a sample selection model. The 
major findings are as follows: Firstly, we find that loans from commercial banks are important 
funding sources for Cambodian firms, and all of the bank loans are denominated in FX 
currency, especially US dollars. Secondly, the ratio of bank loans to total assets depends 
positively on how much collateral they can provide for bank loans. Thirdly, firms that possess 
property and casualty insurance have higher ratios of bank loans to total assets. Lastly, in the 
Cambodian situation where bank loans are only available in FX currency, currency mismatch 
risks push firms to reduce the ratio of bank loans to total assets, especially for highly profitable 
firms. We find that highly profitable firms tend to decrease (increase) the ratio of bank loans in 
response to an increase (a decrease) in currency mismatch risk, although less profitable firms 
are not affected by such currency mismatch risks. These results suggest that, as well as other 
developing countries, external debt procurement heavily depends on how much collateral the 
Cambodian firms can provide and the extent of their business risks. Furthermore, our results 
also suggest that, in highly financially dollarized economies with underdeveloped financial 
systems such as Cambodia, firms with currency mismatch risks tend to reduce bank loans to 
deal with currency mismatch risks. Therefore, development of a local currency loan market 
would allow Cambodian firms with local currency revenues to hedge their currency mismatch 
risks, leading to improvements in financial deepening and inclusion. 
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1. Introduction 
As globalization of the world economy increases, a lot of emerging economies have experienced 
so-called ‘dollarization’, which means that FX currencies are used in lieu of the domestic 
currency (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 2003). In these countries, the proportion of FX funds, 
which are mainly in US dollars (henceforth USD), increase. At the same time, there are growing 
concerns that this might escalate currency mismatches in the balance sheets of firms and 
financial institutions. In recent years, an increasing number of countries in Eastern Europe have 
taken steps to avoid exposing their financial systems to the risk of increased FX debt; for 
example, countries such as Ukraine have banned FX borrowings (Brown, Ongena and Yeşin 
2011). In this context, numerous studies in Eastern European and Latin American countries have 
examined the determinants for raising the FX funds of firms. 
Along with neighboring countries, such as Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar, Cambodia 
shows a remarkable degree of dollarization. According to the World Bank (2015), over the past 
twenty years, Cambodia’s USD bank deposits increased to the level of 92–98% of its total bank 
deposits and, by December 2014, its USD deposit balances accounted for at least half of its GDP. 
Furthermore, since the Cambodian economy dollarized from an early stage of its financial 
development in the 1990s, USD currency has generally evolved to perform all three functions of 
a country’s currency—that is, it not only fulfils the usual function as a store of value but it also 
serves as a unit of account and medium of exchange (National Bank of Cambodia 2012). The 
dollarization of Cambodia has several exceptional features worth noting: among emerging 
economies, Cambodia, in particular, has a remarkably unregulated financial system, with 
financial inclusion strongly lacking even in urban areas. In spite of favorable macroeconomic 
conditions, dollarization has persisted in Cambodia, partly due to the strong network 
externalities related to USD usage. Thus, we need to examine the factors in the Cambodian 
economy that differ from previous research as well as the contexts. 
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In this article, we attempt to empirically investigate Cambodian firms’ capital structure 
decisions by exploiting a unique survey-based dataset, collected in a joint project between the 
National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) and JICA Research Institute (JICA-RI).1 Such a highly 
financially dollarized environment also affects firms’ ability to raise external funds. Figure 1 
provides a glimpse into the current situation of the Cambodian corporate loan market, as of 2013. 
Except for one bank, all of the commercial banks extend loans only in FX currency, indicating 
that firms face difficulties in raising local currency funds from commercial banks. As mentioned 
in Section 2, some Cambodian firms have revenues in local currency. Thus, this unique 
Cambodian environment could affect firms’ capital structure decisions by exposing them to 
currency mismatch risks. 
 
Figure 1: The Ratios of FX Currency in Corporate Loans (as of June 2013) 
 
Despite these unique features of Cambodian dollarization, there remains a paucity of 
empirical investigation. While Cambodian dollarization has been examined by several studies 
from a macroeconomic viewpoint (Duma 2011; Samreth 2011), there have been few studies 
focusing on the microeconomic behaviors of economic agents such as households, firms, and 
financial institutions. A search of previous literature by the authors found no studies that 
empirically examined firms’ fund procurement behaviors under dollarization in Cambodia.  
The main contributions of this article are twofold. This is the first attempt to analyze 
firms’ capital structure decisions in highly dollarized environments from the view of corporate 
finance theory. In the literature of capital structure, Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) 
empirically investigated the capital structure decisions of South-east Asian listed firms by 
                                            
1 In the 2013 national election, the Cambodian government included the promotion of use of the riel as 
one of its policy objectives, outlining its intention to expand the future use of the riel in its report, 
“Action Plans and Measures to Promote the Use of Riel.” In line with this, in 2014, the NBC and 
JICA-RI began the “Empirical Study into Promoting the Use of Domestic Currency in Cambodia.” 
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examining the determinants of debt-to-value ratio for local currency loans and FX loans, 
respectively. However, the institutional settings of the subject countries of their study ensure that 
local currency loans are generally available, and exporting or large firms primarily borrow from 
abroad to finance their investments. In contrast, Cambodia is a highly dollarized country where 
only FX loans are available—even for domestic firms. 2  This study documents empirical 
evidence by using survey-based data of firms in Cambodia and examining non-listed firms’ 
capital structure decisions in such an environment. 
Secondly, this study develops an analytical framework to examine the unique 
circumstances where firms are able to take out only FX-denominated loans. Previous studies on 
dollarization have analyzed firms in countries where both FX and local currency loans are 
available. These studies have mainly examined the problem of currency choice, in terms of 
which currency a firm chooses when taking out a loan (Gelos 2003; Brown Ongena and Yeşin 
2011; Kamil 2012; Mora, Neaime and Aintablian 2013). Different from these cases, there is no 
option for taking out local currency loans for Cambodian firms if they have access to 
commercial bank loans. This unique feature of the Cambodian loan market might affect the 
capital structure decisions of a firm. This market situation makes it difficult for firms to hedge 
currency mismatch risks since they are not able to choose the local currency even though they 
have local currency income. Furthermore, this potential risk could discourage firms from 
accessing commercial bank loans. In addition, we employ Heckman’s selection model to reduce 
the potential bias that comes from borrowing constraints in commercial bank loan markets. The 
analytical framework adopted in this study might be appropriate for use in developing 
economies. 
As a result of our empirical analysis, we find that firms’ borrowings in Cambodia are 
dominated by USD currency. We also find that conventional corporate finance theories, such as 
                                            
2 Appendix Figure 1 provides a glimpse into the corporate loan market in Cambodia, as in 2013. Except 
for one bank, all of the commercial banks extend loans only in FX currency. 
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trade-off theory, agency cost approach, and pecking order theory, can explain Cambodian firms’ 
borrowing behaviors. In addition, we tested the hypothesis that firms might engage in 
risk-hedging behaviors so that the proportion of FX currency in revenues is an additional 
significant factor when taking out FX loans. However, this hypothesis is only confirmed for 
firms with high profitability, meaning that there exists heterogeneity in the effect of currency 
mismatch risks among firms, and firms with low profitability do not consider carefully the 
currency mismatch risks when taking out FX loans. Since low profitability could be translated as 
the low availability of internal funds, this result can be interpreted as firms that have low 
availability of internal funds are likely to take out loans without risk-hedging. It might indicate 
that some Cambodian firms are exposed to currency mismatch risks, which could be a source of 
potential fragility in the Cambodian financial sector. 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature of studies on capital 
structure. Section 3 presents our data in detail and provides descriptive statistics related to 
borrowing behaviors and operations of Cambodian firms. In Section 4, we articulate our 
analytical framework and hypotheses in the case of Cambodian firms’ FX borrowing behaviors. 
Section 5 presents our empirical model and Section 6 examines the estimation results. Finally, 
Section 7 offers our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature on Capital Structure Decisions 
Most previous empirical studies on firms’ capital structure decisions have focused on firms in 
developed countries, although there is an increasing number of studies that deal with firms in 
developing countries as a result of the recent improvement of data availability in those countries. 
These recent studies focus on whether conventional capital structure theories are also valid for 
firms in developing countries, 3 and whether specific factors for developing and transition 
                                            
3 Those studies mainly assess the trade-off theory, agency cost theory, and pecking order theory. 
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economies, such as concentrated ownership structures, the importance of political connections 
and underdeveloped financial systems, influence the capital structure. Booth et al. (2001) 
undertook pioneering work in this field to investigate the determinants of capital structure of 
listed firms in 10 developing countries from Latin America, Asia, and Africa in the period from 
1980-1990. De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) tested the capital structure theories using data of 
listed firms from 42 developing countries. While most extant capital structure theories have been 
developed through the study of developed countries, a series of studies confirmed that these 
theories can also explain firms’ decisions on capital structure in developing countries. In the 
current literature, several studies have constructed large datasets from firms both in developed 
and developing countries. Gao and Zhu (2015) investigated the role of information asymmetry in 
the choice of debt or equity capital for listed firms from 39 developed and developing countries, 
finding that intense information asymmetry leads to an increase in the use of debt capital and a 
decrease in financing through the stock market.  
 For South-east Asian countries, Wiwattanakantang (1999) empirically investigated the 
capital structure of listed firms in Thailand and found that the trade-off theory satisfactorily 
explained capital structures of Thai firms after controlling for the effects of business group 
ownership. Likewise, Pandey (2004) reached a similar conclusion by testing trade-off theory and 
pecking order theory in Malaysian firms. In Chinese listed firms, Chen (2004) found evidence 
that certain firm-specific factors used to explain capital structures in developed economies are 
significant in Chinese listed firms, although the author suggests a need for some modifications in 
the pecking order theory for Chinese firms. The order of preference on sources of funds for 
Chinese firms’ should be: internal funds first, the stock market second, and finally long-term 
borrowings. Furthermore, Huang and Song (2006) found that the capital structure of Chinese 
firms is strongly affected by the tax regime, in addition to the conventional determinants of 
capital structure.  
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 Recently several studies on firms’ borrowing behaviors in developing countries have 
investigated borrowing behaviors in FX currency, although there remains a paucity of empirical 
evidence. This is because firms that are in a better financial condition started to access to FX 
funds in the wake of globalization and also because FX currencies started being used even in 
domestic transactions due to growing dollarization in developing countries. Those studies 
focused on interest rate differentials between local and FX currencies, and exchange rate risks as 
factors behind FX borrowing. In light of trade-off theory and pecking order theory, Allayannis, 
Brown, and Klapper (2003) investigated the determinants of capital structure of 320 listed firms 
from 8 Asian countries, including FX loans from overseas. The authors found that firms take out 
more FX loans if exchange rate risks are lower, if the interest rate differential between FX and 
local currency loans is higher, or if firms have more collateralized assets. Previous studies on FX 
borrowing behaviors mainly focused on East and Central European, and Latin American 
countries (Cowan 2006; Kamil 2012). However, local currency and FX currencies are both 
available in the loan markets of those countries. It is noted that the institutional settings in those 
countries are different from Cambodia since local currency loans are limited and FX currencies 
are only available in Cambodian loan markets for firms. 
 
3. Dollarization and Corporate Finance in Cambodia 
We describe several features of Cambodian corporate finance using unique survey-based micro 
data. The data used in this study was collected between October 2014 and January 2015 for the 
research project “An Empirical Study on Promotion of Home Currency in Cambodia,” carried 
out jointly by NBC and JICA-RI. The survey was aimed at uncovering the real picture of 
currency usage of Cambodian firms in their operations and financing. The survey covered 856 
firms that were randomly sampled from all 25 provinces of Cambodia, ranging from 
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microenterprises to SMEs to large enterprises. 4  The number of firms interviewed was 
determined by region and by firm size, based on the size of economic activities in each region.5 
During the survey, firms were interviewed about their business operations and financial 
activities in 2013; and information on currencies from income statements and balance sheets was 
collected. In cases where firms declined to take the interview, another firm of the same firm size 
in the same province was selected for the interview; firms were interviewed until the total 
sample reached the target number for each category of firm sizes in each region. The aims of the 
survey were explained at the interviews to the head of the targeted administrative division for the 
survey; after obtaining approval, the interviewers visited the firms, ensuring that the response 
rate was relatively high. 
The data encompasses relevant information on outstanding loans, such data on lenders, 
initial and outstanding amounts of loans, maturity of loans, and interest rates. At the time of the 
survey, out of 856 firms, 223 firms responded that they currently had loans. Since some firms 
had more than a single loan, the total number of outstanding loans was 237 in our data. Table 1 
shows the currency choice of loans by funding sources. Results showed that only 11 loans were 
denominated in the local currency, Khmer Riel (KHR), while the remainder were denominated 
in USD. A total of 172 loans (approximately 75% of all loans) were provided by commercial 
banks, indicating that commercial banks are the most significant funding sources for Cambodian 
firms. All the loans from formal lenders, such as commercial banks and microfinance 
institutions were in USD, while KHR loans were provided only by family members, relatives, 
and friends (henceforth ‘kinship network’) or informal lenders. 
                                            
4 In the survey, firms are classified into four categories based on asset size: (1) firms with asset size 
below USD 50,000 are classified as microenterprises; (2) firms with asset size ranging from USD 
50,000 to USD 250,000 are considered small enterprises; (3) firms with asset size ranging from USD 
250,000 to USD 500,000 are as medium-sized enterprises; (4) firms with asset size above 500,000 are 
categorized as large enterprises. There are 204 large enterprises, 183 medium-sized enterprises, 251 
small enterprises, and 218 microenterprises in the sample. 
5 Specifically, the target sample size for each province and firm size was determined according to the 
Economic Census 2011. For details, see Aiba and Tha (2017). 
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In Cambodia, collateral is normally required when firms borrow from commercial banks 
and microfinance institutions (MFIs). Consistently, in our dataset, collateral was required, with 
180 loans from commercial banks and MFIs out of 191 loans (no information was provided for 
the remaining 11 loans), and almost all of the collateral was provided in the form of land titles (in 
2 loan contracts, business contracts were required as collateral).6 This might suggest that the 
existence of collateralized assets is a significant factor for firms to reduce the issues from 
information asymmetry in the Cambodian loan market.7 
 
Table 1: Currency Choices in Loans (by Funding Sources) 
 
In order to reveal which currency those Cambodian firms with loans mainly use in their 
operations, we collated the responses to the question “Which currency does your enterprise 
mainly use?” Table 2 shows the results within firms with loans. We find that, although the 
majority of firms with loans responded that they used USD, 60 firms (about 27%) responded that 
they mainly used KHR. The results of Table 1 and 2 indicate that even the firms mainly using 
local currency have loans in USD. The results might show that, although the firms required loans 
in KHR, they were not able to take out the loan in local currency. In other words, the currency 
choice of loans might be decided based on financial institutions’ requirements rather than the 
firms’ needs. The results also suggest that the firms using local currency could be exposed to 
currency mismatch risks between loans and operations. 
 
Table 2: Main Currencies Used by Firms with Loans 
 
                                            
6 No collateral was required with 42 loans from family/relatives, 2 loans from informal lenders, and 1 
loan from other sources. 
7 However, the land registration system has remained underdeveloped in Cambodia. As of the end of 
2015, the government has issued over 4.15 million land titles, which is 59 percent of the estimated total 
number of land parcels in Cambodia. (Ministry of Land Management Urban Planning and Construction 
2016) 
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Table 3 shows the number of KHR earners and the number of USD earners among those 
who have USD loans and who have KHR loans. The result shows that most firms have revenues 
in a combination of USD and KHR (Panel A and C). We further compared the ratio of FX 
currency in revenues between KHR loan holders and USD loan holders (Panel C). We find that 
the ratio of FX currency in revenues is on average higher for the USD loan holders than for KHR 
loan holders. Although the statistical validity is questionable due to the small sample for the 
KHR holders, we confirm a similar trend found in previous studies, such as Brown, Ongena and 
Yeşin (2011) and Mora, Neaime and Aintablian (2014). 
 
Table 3: Number of USD Earners and KHR Earners Among Loan Holders 
 
In Table 4, we present the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics by size. Since our 
data does not include a variable that would allow us to confirm whether firms faced borrowing 
constraints, we reduced the sample to the firms with loans. The firms are divided by size into 
four size categories: microenterprises, small firms, medium-sized firms, and large firms. First, 
regarding the dummy variable for whether firms would borrow from a bank, we find that larger 
firms are more likely to borrow from commercial banks.  
 
Table 4: Comparison of Loan and Firm Characteristics (by Firm Size) 
 
There is no trend observed for the return on assets (ROA) across sizes of firms, although 
the average ROA of microenterprises is slightly greater and the standard deviation of the ROA is 
extremely large. Regarding the year of establishment and firm sizes, we find that firms with 
loans are older and larger, reflecting that, in many cases, microenterprises have been founded 
very recently and their management tends to be unstable.  
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We also find that large firms have, on average, higher proportions of FX revenues in 
their total revenues. The average of the dummy variable for whether firms export also shows 
greater average values in relation to firm sizes, suggesting a positive relationship between 
revenue and exporting. However, compared with the proportion of FX revenues, the proportion 
of FX expenditure shows no clear trend across firm sizes, with an average of around 60% across 
all firm sizes. 
 
Table 5: Comparison of Loan and Firm Characteristics (by Funding Sources) 
 
In Table 5, we present the descriptive statistics of loan and firm characteristics across 
funding sources. Regarding the amounts of loans, we find that loans from commercial banks are 
approximately ten times larger than those from MFIs and five times larger than those from 
kinship networks. In addition, commercial banks extend loans with better conditions than MFIs 
and kinship networks in terms of interest rates and maturity. Again, the results might indicate 
that commercial banks are significant funding sources for Cambodian firms. In fact, NBC 
regulates MFI activities and restricts the maximum amount at which MFIs can grant loans.  
Moreover, the proportion of FX revenue is much higher in firms with bank loans. While 
no discernible difference is found in the proportion of FX expenditures, FX revenues are higher 
for firms with bank loans. Furthermore, the average of the dummy variable for whether a firm is 
involved in exporting activities is higher for firms with bank loans. No vast difference can be 
observed with regard to ROA, although firms with bank loans on average showed an ROA 1–2% 
lower than those with loans from other funding sources. We also find that firms with bank loans 
are older, suggesting that older firms are less likely to suffer from the problems of information 
asymmetry, possibly because of their reputation.  
Interestingly, we find that there is a gap in currency composition between revenues and 
expenditures, apart from currency mismatch between loans and revenues. Figure 2 illustrates the 
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proportions of FX revenues and FX expenditures of 856 firms. The figure indicates that many 
Cambodian firms face gaps in the proportions of FX revenues and expenditures. Thus, these 
firms might face the exchange rate risks of multiple mixed currencies in their operations; they 
need to convert currency in their operations frequently. In other words, they may face risks from 
cash flow uncertainties, which is one of the specific risks in highly dollarized environments. 
 
Figure 2: The Ratios of FX Revenue and FX Expenditure 
 
4.  Analytical Framework for Firms’ Borrowing Behaviors in Cambodia 
In this section, we present the analytical framework and hypothesis on firms’ borrowing 
behaviors in the case of Cambodia. As seen in Section 2, most borrowing is in USD, indicating 
that Cambodian firms can only raise external funds in FX currency.8 In the previous empirical 
literature on FX borrowing, it has been found that firms typically raise funds using both local 
currency and FX-denominated loans, and there is a wide dispersion in the ratios of FX loans in 
liabilities. On the other hand, as observed in Section 2, the tendency in usage of FX loans in 
Cambodian firms is different. In particular, loans from commercial banks, which might be the 
most important source of borrowing for many firms, are almost entirely issued in USD. 
Accordingly, the conventional estimation of the determinants of the FX loan ratio to total loans, 
which frequently appears in prior research, is not applicable to the case of Cambodia.  
Therefore, since they cannot choose their desired loan currency, Cambodian firms’ 
capital structure problems could involve another determinant in addition to conventional 
corporate finance theories, such as trade-off theory, agency cost approach, and pecking order 
theory. In practice, the financing sources for Cambodian firms consist of three choices: internal 
funds, loans from non-banking sources, and FX bank loans. There are two aspects to this choice: 
                                            
8 As shown in Appendix Figure 1, almost 100% of bank loans in Cambodia are US dollar-denominated.  
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how much external credit they use, and the size of the FX loans they take out. In other words, 
Cambodian firms with local currency revenues face inevitably currency mismatch risks when 
they access loans. In the following section, we develop the theory and hypotheses for the 
determinants of capital structure, based on the context of a highly dollarized economy.  
 
4.1  Determinants of debt financing 
4.1.1  Trade-off approach 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) argued that, in the case of a perfect capital market without 
information asymmetry—meaning that there are no transaction costs, no corporate taxes or risks 
of corporate insolvency—corporate value would not rely on capital structure, and the method of 
corporate financing would not impact on corporate value. In the real world with corporate tax, 
however, debt financing can provide a tax shield against corporate tax. Thus, firms have an 
incentive to raise the debt ratio to increase corporate value. However, the merits of debt tax 
shields weaken when a firm can use various tax deductions and preferential systems besides the 
corporate tax systems, such as depreciation, investment incentives, and the like (called non-debt 
tax shields). In Cambodia, there is little awareness of the use of debt tax shields, because 
knowledge of corporate accounting is poor except for a few companies, and the government’s 
ability to collect taxes is weak. Moreover, in practice, firms do not use non-debt tax shield 
frameworks, not only because knowledge of accounting and the tax system is not widespread but 
also because the Cambodian government follows almost laissez-faire policies. Thus, one can 
expect to see practically no debt tax shield effect on financing behavior. 
On the other hand, companies do have the incentive to lower insolvency risk by 
lowering their debt ratio because, when their dependence on debt increases, the insolvency risk 
rises due to exposure to exogenous shocks. One can expect a lower debt ratio because the cost of 
debt financing rises as the firm’s insolvency risk rises (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Köksal, and 
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Orman 2015).9 Moreover, because companies with higher rates of return have lower default risk 
due to their larger cash flows, these companies may have an incentive to take out larger amounts 
of debt financing. 
 
Hypothesis 1: As firms’ business risks increase, the leverage ratio of firms will decrease. 
 
4.1.2  Agency cost approach 
In a world with information asymmetry and imperfect contracts, firms may encounter an agency 
problem, characterized by a conflict of interest among a firm’s stakeholders, including 
shareholders, managers, and creditors. In Cambodia, few hostile takeovers occur, firstly because 
high concentration ownership is normal, not only for microenterprises and medium-sized 
enterprises but also for large companies; and secondly, because there is no well-established stock 
market. On the other hand, there is a large information gap between external creditors, such as 
financial institutions and firms, and high costs to screen and monitor investment targets, which is 
an impediment for firms seeking external financing (Allayannis, Brown and Klapper 2003). The 
low level of business acumen and the slow adoption of bookkeeping systems makes it difficult 
for external creditors to evaluate the operational standing of a firm.10 Thus, the issue of agency 
costs involved in Cambodian firms is likely to occur between large shareholders who also serve 
as management and external creditors. 
Firms can resolve agency issues between external creditors and managers by providing 
collateral (Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper 2003). Significant problems exist related to 
                                            
9 Desai, Foley and Hines (2008) empirically verify that firms adjust the size of risk by adjusting the 
capital composition for large management risks. On the other hand, Booth et al. (2001) empirically 
analyze the relationship between the capital composition among Asian countries and the standard 
deviation of sales as management risk, finding differing results that are in a positive or negative 
direction depending on the country. 
10 According to an exhaustive survey of the company census performed in 2011, close to 99% of 
Cambodian companies operate informally, without operating licenses from the supervising government 
agency. 
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information asymmetry in new projects for small-scale firms and firms with high growth 
potential (Clark and Judge 2008). Therefore, one can expect that it becomes easier to secure 
financing from external creditors as the firm acquires more fixed assets to use as collateral or the 
firm grows in size. 
 
Hypothesis 2: As agency cost caused by information asymmetry between firms and creditors 
increases, firms’ leverage ratio will decrease.  
 
4.1.3  Pecking Order Theory 
Under conditions of information asymmetry between a lender and a borrower, the cost of 
financing will depend on its source (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993). In Cambodia, there are 
large differences in information asymmetry depending on the financing source. Therefore, in 
line with the suppositions of the pecking order theory, one can also assume that companies will 
first secure financing from their own funds and from related parties with which there is little 
information asymmetry. They will then seek financing from microfinance institutions with 
which there is relatively little information asymmetry, and they will finally  seek to secure 
financing through bank loans, which have the highest information asymmetry.11 Generally, the 
sufficiency of a company’s internal reserves increases as its potential retained earnings increases. 
Since companies with high rates of profit have higher amounts of internal reserves available for 
financing, these companies are not likely to secure access to external funding. In other words, 
the higher a company’s rate of profit, the smaller its debt ratio is expected to be. 
 
Hypothesis 3: As firms’ rate of profit increase, the leverage ratio will decrease. 
                                            
11 Presenting objective information is crucial for a creditability evaluation for bank loans. More than 
half of micro and small enterprises cannot access bank loans because they cannot submit documents to 
allow for an objective evaluation. 
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4.2  Additional problems related to FX denominated loans 
When debts in FX currency are incurred, additional insolvency risk factors and agency costs can 
arise when compared to incurring debt in the local currency. It is important to make adjustments 
for the situation in Cambodia with regard to such risks and issues. 
 
4.2.1 Currency mismatch risks between cash inflow and debts 
In Cambodia, in addition to regular insolvency risks, there is also the potential for insolvency 
arising from a currency mismatch between cash flow and liabilities due to dollarization in the 
economy. In developing countries in which dollarization has occurred, the interest rate on US 
dollar-denominated debt is generally lower than that on national-currency denominated debt. 
When a company that has national-currency denominated revenues uses US dollar loans, it has 
an advantage in that the loan interest rate is lower than that for national-currency denominated 
loans. However, there is also the disadvantage of higher costs in case of financial ruin due to the 
currency mismatch between revenue and loans repayable. 
Previous studies on currency choice in debts documented the theoretical models and 
showed empirical evidence that firms choose FX loans to avoid currency mismatch risks. Jeanne 
(2005) and Cowan (2006) theoretically revealed that, in cases where the aforementioned 
trade-off relationship exists, risk-averse firms tend to have more FX loans if the ratio of FX 
revenue to total revenue is higher. Luca and Petrova (2008) also provided a theoretical model 
incorporating both banks and firms in order to support this theory. They demonstrated that firms 
with a high level of risk aversion tend to match the denomination of loans with the currency in 
revenues. Meanwhile, Gelos (2003), Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003), Brown, Ongena 
and Yeşin (2011), Mora, Neaime and S. Aintablian (2011), and Kamil (2012) empirically 
verified that when firms choose a loan currency, they match the currency composition of debts 
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and revenues.12 As these studies show, as the ratio of FX revenue to total revenue increases, the 
ratio of FX debt to total debt is expected to increase, ceteris paribus. 
In the case of Cambodia, limitations on the availability of local currency loans make it 
difficult for firms to hedge currency mismatch risks when firms have local currency revenues. 
Thus, if firms have a larger portion of local currency in their revenues, they will have smaller 
amount of FX loans due to the currency mismatch risks. In other words, firms with FX currency 
revenues have an advantage when borrowing from commercial banks. If firms have a larger 
portion of FX currency in their revenues, they can raise more external funds from commercial 
banks. 
 
Hypothesis 4: If a firm has a larger share of FX currency in its revenue, its leverage ratio will 
rise. 
 
4.2.2 Agency cost problems and debts in FX currency  
Prior research also finds additional agency costs related to FX currency borrowing. Allayannis, 
Brown, and Klapper (2003) uncovered a relationship in which firms owning higher amounts of 
fixed assets are more likely to use FX currency credit. This suggests that a company’s ability to 
provide collateral is an important variable as a determinant for loans, even when the economy 
has shifted to US dollars. In addition, Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) revealed that the 
firms were inclined to have a higher debt ratio as their use of US dollar debt increased. This 
suggests that companies that use FX currency debt have an information asymmetry with external 
creditors that differs from that of other firms and that there is a propensity for these companies to 
find it easier to access financing. Moreover, according to Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2014), 
                                            
12 Accordingly, the export company dummy used as a representative variable for FX revenue has a 
significantly positive relationship with the probability of selecting US dollar debt, and this evidence 
supports the argument of firms’ risk-averse actions in selecting the currency denomination of debt. 
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when information is insufficient for external creditors to verify the currency composition of 
company revenues, there could be an adverse selection of companies with local currency 
revenues choosing FX debt because FX debt financing has a lower interest rate than local 
currency debt. This view also derives from Hypothesis 2 in the context of Cambodia.   
 
4.2.3 Difference in sensitivity to currency mismatch risks 
As pointed out in previous literature, the extent of corporate risk management may be different 
among firms (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993; Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper 2003). In other 
words, there exists a possibility of heterogeneity in hedging behaviors against currency 
mismatch risks. In highly dollarized countries, where FX currency borrowings are only available 
for external funds, borrowing money always comes along with additional costs as currency 
mismatch risks, particularly for firms with local currency income. In this regard, hedging 
behaviors against currency mismatch risks may differ among firms, depending on their 
characteristics. 
We conjecture that availability of internal funds could be a factor in deriving the 
heterogeneity in hedging behaviors against currency mismatch risks. In previous literature on 
corporate finance, it is argued that, if internal funds are available, external funds could become 
costly for firms (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988). In addition, the previous study suggests 
that an increase in the cost of funds will lead to an increase in incentive for firms to take a 
hedging behavior (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993). Therefore, firms that have greater internal 
funds would be more likely to adjust the risk of currency mismatches when taking out external 
funds. Accordingly, since there is only FX currency available for external funds in Cambodia, 
firms with greater internal funds will borrow less if they have less FX currency in income, due to 
the currency mismatch risk. Meanwhile, firms with smaller internal funds may be likely to 
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ignore the currency risk, since the benefit of obtaining sufficient funds outweighs the currency 
risk. 
 
Hypothesis 5: As availability of internal funds increases (decreases), the sensitivity to currency 
mismatch risks will increase (decreases). 
 
5.  Empirical Methodology 
5.1  Estimation strategy 
As mentioned earlier, firms are likely to choose commercial banks when taking out loans, and 
such loans from commercial banks are on average much larger than those from other funding 
sources.13 Given that borrowing from kinship networks and MFIs has different characteristics 
and in practice can be seen as a type of internal funds, bank borrowing is the only external and 
significant funding source for firms’ financing in Cambodia. Based on the findings above, we 
examine what factors affect firms’ capital structures in Cambodia, which is one of the most 
dollarized economies, using the survey-based data. In our study, we regress the ratios of bank 
borrowings to total assets on a firm’s characteristics. Specifically, we estimate the following 
equation (1): 
 
ln (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖/𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 
where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖/𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 represents the ratio of bank borrowings to total 
assets of firm i.14 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 represents a vector of firm characteristics of firm i. It is natural to assume 
                                            
13 In fact, we ran several regressions with MFI borrowings and borrowings from kinship networks as a 
dependent variable instead of bank loans. Most of the results in coefficients were different from the bank 
borrowings. These results are available on request.  
14 We found that bank borrowings were all denominated in USD in our dataset.  
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that the debt dependency varies across industries. Therefore, we control for the effect by 
including industry dummies in the model. In this study, we categorize industries into four types; 
the manufacturing sector, the retail and wholesale trade sector, the tourism sector, and others.  
 It is noteworthy that all of the bank borrowings of firms in our sample are denominated 
in USD. Thus, our regression model does not only capture the conventional factors in the 
relationship between capital structure and firms’ characteristics, but also captures additional 
factors in the relationship between FX borrowing and firm characteristics, such as currency 
mismatch risks. 
 
5.2  Explanatory variables 
First, we employ a volatility of monthly sales as an indicator of firms’ operational risks, in order 
to test Hypothesis 1 for the trade-off theory. Specifically, in our dataset, respondents 
self-evaluated changes in sales of each of 12 months, choosing from five categories: ‘No sales’, 
‘Decrease’, ‘Stable’, ‘Increase’, and ‘Highest’. We treat the variable as a continuous variable 
from 1 to 5, and calculate a standard deviation of the variable as the volatility of monthly sales 
for each firm. As a proxy for the operational risks, Booth (2001) employs the volatility of ROA 
during the subject period, and Köksal and Orman (2015) use the standard deviation of sales in 
the past three years. Those authors find that there is a negative correlation between a debt-asset 
ratio and an operational risk. In addition, we further control for the effect of having insurance, in 
order to capture the extent of operational risks of enterprises, since having insurance generally 
decreases the operational risk of firms. We use the insurance dummy which takes one if firms 
have insurance for their operations. We expect that this variable would negatively affect bank 
borrowings ratio. 
Secondly, in the following manner, we test if agency cost theory and pecking order 
theory fit in Cambodian firms’ behaviors. To test Hypothesis 2 (agency cost theory), we use the 
 
21 
 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets as a proxy for collateral values of firms, which are considered 
to reduce information asymmetry problem between firms and lenders. Booth (2001) also 
employs this variable as a proxy for a firm’s ability to provide collateral to reduce the agency 
cost. To test Hypothesis 3 (pecking order hypothesis), we follow Allayannis, Brown, and 
Klapper (2003) and Gao and Zhu (2015), and employ profitability, which is supposed to reflect 
the availability of firms’ internal funds. In order to capture profitability, we include ROA. ROA 
is created by subtracting the amount of expenditure from the total income and dividing it by total 
assets.  
In order to investigate the effects of additional business risks stemming from dollarized 
environments, we use a ratio of FX income to total income in the model to examine the 
relationship between FX borrowing and the currency composition of revenues (Hypothesis 4). In 
previous studies, dummies for export firms or the ratio of income from exporting to total income 
have been used as a proxy for FX income due to limitations on data availability (Brown, Ongena, 
and Yeşin 2011; Brown et al. 2011; Mora, Neaime and Aintablian 2011). However, in the case of 
Cambodia, since a lot of firms use FX currency in domestic transactions as well as local currency, 
it is inappropriate to use income from exporting as a proxy for FX income. Accordingly, we 
employ the ratio of FX income. However, since there is a possibility that export firms tend to 
have larger borrowings, we also estimate the model with an exporter dummy to control for the 
effect.  
Finally, it is expected that the extent of information asymmetry and business risks could 
differ across industries and the difference might affect firms’ choices of capital structure. To 
control for the differences, we use industry dummies which represent categories of industrial 
sectors as (1) manufacture, (2) retail and wholesale, (3) hotel and tourism sectors, and (4) others.  
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5.3  Sample selection bias due to borrowing constraints 
To estimate the coefficients in the equation (1), we employ Heckman’s sample selection 
model.15 In Cambodia, it is likely that many firms with the need for external borrowings cannot 
gain access to commercial bank loans due to informational opaqueness and low abilities of banks 
to extend loans to such firms.16 In addition, Cambodia is categorized as a low-income country 
and most extant firms are small or medium-sized. Furthermore, there is no explicit standard for 
accounting and many firms do not keep official accounting records, although commercial banks 
require a solid financial statement to extend loans. Therefore, many firms are likely to be 
screened out (rejected) or discouraged by commercial banks, undermining their demand for 
loans. Thus, simple estimation within firms with bank borrowings could be biased due to 
missing firms that have been denied or become discouraged.17 
Firms that only have borrowings from microfinance institutions (MFIs) and kinship 
networks might also face financial constraints. We found that some firms in our dataset only 
borrowed from MFIs, or their families and relatives (kinship networks), instead of commercial 
banks. It might be easier for firms to borrow from MFIs than from commercial banks, since 
MFIs use a specific lending scheme to lend to poor and small/medium-sized enterprises by 
exploiting soft information, while commercial banks mainly use hard information such as 
financial statements to screen out firms. In developing countries, MFIs and kinship networks are 
funding sources that firms can easily access because, among other sources, information 
asymmetry is the smallest. On the other hand, it is more difficult to borrow large amounts of 
                                            
15 Even though we attempted to mitigate the endogeneity issue of sample selection biases, there could 
be other endogeneity issues, such as reverse causality and omitted variable biases. However, because of 
the limitation of the NBC-JICA survey, we could not use valid instrumental variables to deal with these 
potential biases. Constructing panel data could provide one solution by allowing for use of fixed effects 
and lagged dependent variables to model partial adjustment over time (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 2013). These problems should be addressed in future research. 
16 According to World Bank Global Findex, financial inclusion rates in Cambodia are 28% as the 
percentage of people at the age of over 15 in terms of the rate of formal borrowing, 22% in terms of the 
percentage of accounts in formal financial institutions, and 4% in terms of the rate of formal savings. 
17 According to Brown, Popov and Yeşin (2011) and Cole and Sokolyk (2016), firms with no loans can 
be classified into three groups: (1) firms which have no need of loans, (2) firms for which loan 
applications are rejected by lenders, and (3) firms which did not apply or became discouraged. 
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money and firms are more likely to suffer from insufficient funds when borrowing from MFIs or 
kinship networks than in the case of commercial banks, as seen in Section 2. In addition, interest 
rates on loans from MFIs are generally higher than commercial banks. Therefore, it is natural to 
assume that firms would borrow from commercial banks if they can receive finance from 
commercial banks, and firms that have only loans from MFIs and kinship networks are likely to 
face borrowing constraints. 
Accordingly, equation (1) estimations can be subject to sample selection biases due to 
firms that are not able to borrow from commercial banks despite the demand for external funds. 
To carry out an unbiased estimation, it is necessary to take into account the sample selection 
process in the estimation; that is, the process of whether firms gain access to commercial bank 
loans or not. However, our dataset does not cover the information on which firms are exactly 
facing borrowing constraints or were screened out (rejected) or discouraged by banks. Thus, we 
assume that firms with debt from MFIs or kinship networks were not able to borrow from 
commercial banks, and they borrowed from MFIs or kinship networks. Under such an 
assumption, we run the selection equation below. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = 1(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 0) (2) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 represents the dummy variable that takes on one if firm i 
borrowed from commercial banks and zero if they borrowed from MFIs or kinship networks. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 are vectors of variables which are determinants of accessibility to bank loans. We use the 
same variables used in equation (1) as 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  and use variables which satisfy the exclusive 
restriction as 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 . For the variable which satisfies the exclusive restriction, we employ the 
logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm sizes. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) study the 
determinants of borrowing constraints for firms and find that firm size is one of the significant 
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factors in determining whether firms can access financial institutions to borrow more. Similarly, 
Cole and Sololyk (2016) focus on SME finance in the USA and find that larger firms are more 
likely to receive credit from commercial banks. Brown et al. (2011) study which kinds of firms 
have had loans approved in European countries, finding that small firms are not likely to apply 
for loans, although their study does not confirm the significant effect of firm size on loan 
rejection. These studies suggest that firm size could be a significant factor in determining 
whether firms are rejected or discouraged from bank loan applications. We conjecture that this is 
also likely the case in Cambodia since the lenders that can provide large amounts of funds are 
limited to commercial banks in Cambodia.  
 
6.  Empirical Results 
As described earlier, there are 223 firms with loans in our dataset. However, since we dropped 
part of the sample that had missing values in amounts of loans and explanatory variables, the 
sample size was reduced to 114 firms. Out of this 114, 70 firms borrowed from commercial 
banks and 38 borrowed from family/relatives or MFIs. 
Table 6 shows the results of the estimation of determinants of Cambodian firms’ capital 
structure.18 Note that all of bank loans here are denominated in USD. Thus, we estimated the 
determinants of capital structure decisions for the Cambodian firms in terms of the dollar amount 
borrowed**67** in FX bank loans. In the estimation, we employed Heckman’s sample selection 
model. We estimated equation 1 and 2 simultaneously using maximum likelihood estimation. In 
Table 5, we presented the estimation results of both equation 1 (Main equation) and equation 2 
(Selection) from three different models. Model 1 is presented as the baseline model. In Model 2, 
we included an exporter dummy which takes one if firms export goods. In Model 3, we included 
                                            
18 Correlation matrix of variables used in the estimation is presented in Appendix Table 1. 
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an interaction term of the ratio of USD in sales and ROA. In Model 4, we included all variables 
in the estimation.19 
 
Table 6: Results of estimation of determinants of Cambodian firms’ capital structure. 
 
In Table 6, we find that rho, which represents the correlation between the residuals in 
equation 1 and 2, is significantly positive in all models. This means that, if firms without bank 
loans were able to take out bank loans, they would take out smaller bank loans than firms that 
currently have bank loans. We also find that the coefficients of the logarithm of total assets, 
which we included as the exclusive restriction in equation 2, are significantly positive. Those 
results suggest that sample selection bias exists in the estimation of the simple OLS method due 
to exclusion of some firms from the bank loan market. The results also indicate that firm size is 
an important factor in determining firms’ access to bank loans in Cambodia, in line with previous 
studies (Hadlock and Pierce 2010; Brown et al. 2011; Cole and Sololyk 2016). 
Regarding firms’ borrowing behaviors, the results are consistent with our hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 1-2). Firstly, we find that the coefficient of the ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
(Ratio of Fixed Assets) is significant and positive in the main equation of all models. In line with 
Booth et al. (2001) and Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003), the results indicate that firms 
with more fixed assets can borrow larger amounts when borrowing from commercial banks. 
Accordingly, the results imply that whether or not firms have non-financial and collateralizable 
assets is an important factor in determining how much firms can borrow from commercial banks 
                                            
19 We also estimated the Heckman’s selection model with a clustering method in calculation of standard 
errors among industries. The results are presented in Appendix Table 2. The results are largely the same, 
although the significance of some variables disappears. Some differences in statistical significance could 
be due to the small sample problem but our main results do not change. Thus, the additional analysis of 
the clustering method does not change our conclusion. 
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due to high information asymmetry in commercial bank loan markets, similar to other 
developing countries.20  
Secondly, coefficients of the volatility of sales are not significant in all specifications in 
Table 5. Meanwhile, the dummy for firms with insurance (Having insurance) is positively and 
significantly associated with the FX bank leverage ratio in several models (Model 1, 3, and 4). 
The results can be interpreted as managers taking out large loans since they find that risks 
relating to their business are mitigated by having insurance. The results are in line with the 
prediction from trade-off theory (Hypothesis 1) that firms with smaller risk tend to borrow more. 
The results may imply that health or accident insurance can lower risks in business, and have a 
positive effect on firm management by reducing borrowing constraints in Cambodia. 
We find that the estimated coefficients of the ratio of FX currency in sales (Ratio of FX 
sales) are not significant in the main equation of all models, although Cambodia is one of the 
most dollarized economies. The results do not support our hypothesis that firms with more FX 
currency in sales borrow more FX loans. Interestingly, it might seem that firms’ borrowing is not 
affected by currency mismatch risks even in the heavily dollarized economy. Meanwhile, we 
find interesting results in Model 3 and 4, which both include the interaction term of ratio of FX 
currency in sales and ROA. Firstly, we find that the ROA is negatively estimated in Model 3 and 
4. In line with our prediction from pecking order theory (Hypothesis 3), the results suggest that 
firms with plenty of internal funds are unlikely to have external debts, possibly because external 
debt funds are relatively costly. Secondly, we find that the interaction term of ratio of FX 
currency in sales and ROA is positively and significantly associated with the amount of FX 
borrowing. This means that the relationship between the ratio of FX currency in sales and FX 
borrowing differs depending on the availability of internal funds. In other words, firms with 
                                            
20 We also regressed the total-loans-to-asset ratio which includes loans from MFIs or kinship networks. 
In that case, we did not find any significant signs with the ratio of fixed assets. This might suggest that 
collateralizable assets are not determinants of firms’ borrowing from MFIs and kinship network, 
possibly because of low information asymmetry when borrowing from those sources. Results are 
available on request.   
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more internal funds tend to adjust the currency mismatch risk, while firms with less internal 
funds do not care about such risks. Therefore, the results are in line with our hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 5), and further provide an important implication that there exists heterogeneity in 
firms’ behaviors relating to hedging against currency mismatch risks, and the insignificant 
results in Model 1 and 2 might come from the misspecification of heterogeneity.  
Furthermore, the ratios of FX sales are significantly positive in selection equation of all 
models, suggesting that firms with larger shares of FX currency in sales are more likely to have 
accessibility to bank loans. These results may suggest that firms with a larger share of FX 
currency in sales will have a lower likelihood of facing borrowing constraints when accessing 
bank loans. In addition, when including an exporter dummy (Exporter Dummy), we find the 
same results, which implies that whether or not the firms are exporters does not affect the capital 
structure. This is possibly because the transactions are heavily dollarized in Cambodia, and 
occurs regardless of whether firms are exporters or not.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we empirically investigated the features and determinants of capital structure 
decisions in a highly dollarized economy, using micro data collected in a survey carried out by 
NBC and JICA-RI in 2014. We used the financial information of 223 firms which had received a 
loan during the period and examined the relationship between the firm’s characteristics and the 
ratio of FX bank loans to total assets. Our contribution is that our study is the first to empirically 
investigate firms’ fundraising behaviors in Cambodia using large-scale survey-based data. In 
addition, our study is the first one to focus on firms’ capital structure decisions in a highly 
dollarized environment where only FX currency is available for external funds, while most 
previous studies in the literature of dollarization investigated currency choices in borrowings. 
Moreover, we took into account the selection bias problem of whether firms can access bank 
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loans, which is likely to be an issue in emerging and developing countries. Our findings on 
Cambodian firms may be helpful for understanding firms’ capital structure decisions in the 
heavily dollarized environments of other emerging economies. In recent years, dollarization has 
become increasingly widespread around the world, and demand for FX borrowings has also 
increased. We believe that the findings in this paper can provide useful information for further 
discussion on global trends in dollarization.  
Our empirical results reveal several interesting facts. Firstly, we found that loans from 
commercial banks are important funding sources for Cambodian firms, and all of the bank loans 
are denominated in FX currency, especially the USD. Secondly, Cambodian firms’ capital 
structure decisions are rational and in line with the predictions from conventional economic 
theories. In particular, the ratio of fixed assets (availability of collateral) has a large effect on 
firms’ borrowing from commercial banks. This suggests that provision of collateral is a 
significant factor in reducing agency costs. In other words, the immaturity of the financial 
market has led to information asymmetry between banks and firms. Thirdly, having insurance (a 
proxy for operational risks) has a significant effect on firms’ borrowing from banks. This might 
be because firms recognize that insurance has efficacy on the reduction of operational risks, and 
also partly because it is easy for banks to verify whether firms have insurance. Fourthly, an 
increase in ROA (the availability of internal funds) can reduce the ratio of firms’ borrowing from 
banks to total assets. This finding might suggest that, due to significant information asymmetry, 
there exists a clear difference in funding costs between internal and external funds in Cambodia. 
Fifthly, as a specific feature in heavily dollarized economies, the interaction term of the ratio of 
FX currency in sales (the proxy for currency mismatch) and ROA has a positive sign, while the 
ratio of FX currency in sales per se does not affect FX borrowing. It means that there is 
heterogeneity in firms’ hedging behaviors against currency mismatch risks, and firms with 
plenty of internal finds are likely to take out smaller amount of FX loans if they have less FX 
currency in sales. In other words, the results imply that firms with lower internal funds 
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potentially have to take on currency mismatch risks in return for obtaining the external debts. 
Thus, there is a possibility that firms’ reckless behavior in borrowing can be a potential risk to 
Cambodian financial markets. Lastly, the estimation results of the Heckman selection model 
indicate that sample selection bias is significant in the case where we run a simple OLS model. 
This suggests that some firms cannot access bank loans—an indication of the immaturity of 
Cambodian financial markets. In particular, we found that firms with lower FX revenues tend to 
have less accessibility to bank loans. 
From the findings above, we can draw several implications in regard to policy issues. 
Firstly, it is necessary to reduce information asymmetry between firms and external funders. We 
found that having collateral and having insurance result in significant effects on firms’ capital 
structure decisions, indicating that there exists significant information asymmetry in the 
Cambodian financial market. In order to reduce information asymmetry, it is necessary to 
develop banks’ screening capacity, and for firms to keep accurate accounting records and to 
better organize their financial information. Furthermore, it is necessary for governments to 
establish accounting standards and develop financial markets. 
Secondly, it is necessary to facilitate firms’ use of collateral and insurance in their 
businesses. Although land titles are the most commonly used collateral, the land registration 
system is still insufficient in Cambodia. Promotion of land registration is important in enabling 
firms to acquire enough funds. Furthermore, since promotion of property insurance and workers’ 
compensation insurance may also be effective in enhancing corporate finance, then corporate 
works of industrial associations, governments, and financial institutions will be necessary. 
Lastly, it is necessary to deal with currency mismatch risks in dollarized economies. 
Since Cambodia is one of the most dollarized economies, the ratio of FX currency in sales 
widely varies across firms, and there are also mismatches in currency compositions between 
sales and expenditures and between sales and debts. Although the exchange rate of USD to KHR 
has been stable in recent years, there are potential risks of exchange rate changes in the firms’ 
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operations. Even though it is unrealistic to stop the use of FX currency in short run, it is 
important for firms and financial institutions to pay attention to this potentially serious issue. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that firms with currency mismatch risks tend to reduce bank 
loans to deal with currency mismatch risks. Therefore, development of a local currency loan 
market might allow Cambodian firms with local currency revenues to hedge their currency 
mismatch risks, leading to improvements in financial deepening and inclusion. 
However, there are several limitations to our study due to data availability. Our dataset is 
missing values in several variables used in the estimation, especially for the amount of sales. 
Thus, the sample size of our study became smaller. Furthermore, the data collected in the 
NBC/JICA-RI survey only covers the information on outstanding loans. Therefore, it is difficult 
to distinguish between firms which face borrowing constraints and firms which are not in need 
of funds. In this regard, we dealt with this sample selection bias by employing a sample selection 
model, and setting the selection equation of whether a firm has access to bank loans or access to 
MFI loans and kinship networks. However, we did not identify exactly which firms are excluded 
from bank loans and which firms do not require external funds. Thus, in our empirical 
methodology, there might be still a potential problem in selection of the firms that face 
borrowing constraints. Information on whether or not a firm has applied for loans in the past is 
needed to truly examine such selection biases, while we obtained the results which are consistent 
with our hypotheses despite these problems.  
In addition, because of the limitations of the NBC/JICA-RI survey, we could not use 
valid instrumental variables to resolve other endogeneity issues such as reverse causality and 
omitted variable biases. Constructing panel data could provide a solution by allowing for use of 
fixed effects and lagged dependent variables to model partial adjustment over time (Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2013). Similarly, it is difficult to examine currency 
mismatches between assets and liabilities using our dataset, since the data does not cover 
currency denominations of all financial assets. In this regard, future work will need to take into 
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consideration how to capture the relevant data, and the design of the next survey by 
NBC/JICA-RI should reflect on those results from our analysis.21  
 
                                            
21 The second stage of our survey is planned to be conducted in August-November 2017. We are 
planning to expand our survey to collect more variables and we are going to track the same firms to 
construct panel data. 
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Table 1: Currency Choices in Loans (by Funding 
Sources) 
KHR USD Total
Commercial Banks 0 172 172
Microfinance Institutions 0 19 19
Family, Friends, and Relatives 4 38 42
Informal lenders 2 1 3
Others 0 1 1
Total 6 231 237
Source : Survey data from JICA and NBC joint project  
 
 
Table 2: Main Currencies Used by Firms with Loans 
Frequency Percent.
KHR 60 26.91
USD 126 56.5
Other currencies 15 6.73
N.A. 21 9.42
Don't Know 1 0.45
Total 223 100
Source : Survey data from JICA and NBC joint project  
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Table 3: Number of USD Earners and KHR Earners Among 
Loan Holders 
Panel A: USD loan holders
Earning in KHR
No Yes Total
No 0 10 10
Yes 9 153 162
Total 9 163 172
Earnings in
USD
 
 
Panel B: KHR loan holders
Earning in KHR
No Yes Total
No 0 2 2
Yes 0 2 2
Total 0 4 4
Earnings in
USD
 
 
Panel C: The ratio of FX currency in Sales
Obs Mean S.D.
USD loan holders 172 0.48 0.34
KHR loan holders 4 0.15 0.24  
Source: Survey data from NBC and JICA-RI joint project 
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Table 4: Comparison of Firm Characteristics (by Firm Sizes) 
 
Bank loan
(Dummy)
Amount of a
loan when
taken out
Amout of
outstanding
loans
Interest
rate on loan
per month
(%)
Duration of
Loan
(Month)
ROA
Ratio of
Sales in FX
Ratio of
Expenditure
in FX
Having
insurance
(Dummy)
Year of
establishment
Exporter
(Dummy)
Amount of
Loans (as a
ratio of total
assets)
Unit of
observation
Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Micro Mean 0.50 13,178.26 16,321.25 1.61 29.12 0.09 0.35 0.60 0.02 2007.36 0.02 0.64
S.D. (0.51) (13533.15) (27100.01) (0.53) (16.32) (0.59) (0.34) (0.37) (0.14) (5.8) (0.14) (1.36)
Observations 48 46 48 28 34 41 41 45 48 47 48 36
Small Mean 0.73 37,483.09 37,252.70 1.28 40.08 0.06 0.44 0.64 0.09 2005.12 0.09 0.27
S.D. (0.45) (32260.96) (47020.18) (0.33) (26.49) (0.13) (0.28) (0.33) (0.29) (7.15) (0.29) (0.30)
Observations 74 69 74 49 52 55 60 64 74 74 74 56
Medium Mean 0.91 82,948.72 67,044.78 1.05 38.64 0.03 0.43 0.56 0.26 2002.80 0.20 0.19
S.D. (0.28) (69298.34) (98582.9) (0.15) (26.62) (0.14) (0.35) (0.38) (0.44) (8.76) (0.4) (0.20)
Observations 46 39 46 30 36 30 34 34 46 46 46 26
Large Mean 0.95 542,484.80 563,400.00 0.94 42.78 0.09 0.68 0.62 0.64 2001.20 0.36 0.22
S.D. (0.23) (1486897) (2155509) (0.20) (44.52) (0.19) (0.34) (0.36) (0.49) (7.01) (0.49) (0.14)
Observations 55 44 55 26 41 38 40 51 55 55 55 31
Total Mean 0.77 153,014.50 168,660.00 1.23 38.15 0.07 0.47 0.61 0.25 2004.14 0.17 0.33
S.D. (0.42) (726631.5) (1088361) (0.41) (30.68) (0.32) (0.34) (0.35) (0.43) (7.52) (0.37) (0.72)
Observations 223 198 223 133 163 164 175 194 223 222 223 149  
Note: mean values, standard deviations, and the number of observations are presented in each cell. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. “Bank loan (Dummy)” represents 
whether a firm has any loan from a commercial bank. “Amount of loans when taken out (per loan)” represents the amount of a loan per loan when a firm borrows. “Interest rate of loan per 
month” represents the interest rate on an outstanding loan. “Duration of loan (months)” represents how long the maturity of an outstanding loan is. “Amount of outstanding loans” 
represents the amount of an outstanding loan. “ROA” represents the profit over total assets. “Ratio of Sales in FX” represents the ratio of FX currency sales to total sales. “Ratio of 
Expenditure in FX” represents the ratio of FX expenditure to total expenditure. “Having insurance” is a dummy variable which takes one if a firm has business insurance. “Year of 
establishment” represents the age of a firm since it started operations. “Export (Dummy)” is a dummy variable which takes one if a firm is engaged in any exporting activities. “Amount of 
loans as a ratio of total assets” represents the amount of total loans held by a firm as a ratio of total assets.  
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Table 5: Comparison of Firm Characteristics (by Funding Sources) 
Amount of
loans when
taken out
Amout of
outstanding
loans
Interest
rate on loan
per month
(%)
Duration of
Loan
(Month)
ROA
Ratio of
Sales in FX
Ratio of
Expenditur
e in FX
Having
insurance
(Dummy)
Year of
establishment
Exporter
(Dummy)
Total
Assets
(USD)
Amount of
loans (as a
ratio of total
assets)
Loan Loan Loan Loan Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Bank Loan Mean 213233.7 340287.6 1.18 33.83 0.05 0.52 0.61 0.26 2003.68 0.22 645360.2 0.35
S.D. (992448.9) (1583808) (0.40) (25.64) (0.22) (0.33) (0.35) (0.44) (7.76) (0.42) (1790049) (0.81)
Observation 102 103 79 94 80 85 95 103 102 103 104 104
0
MFI Loans Mean 17000 19032.86 1.59 35.46 0.07 0.25 0.51 0.07 2006.64 0.14 86262.86 0.36
S.D. (12824.26) (18397.3) (0.30) (17.00) (0.15) (0.3) (0.41) (0.27) (6.32) (0.36) (94161.14) (0.54)
Observation 14 14 14 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14
0 0
Mean 42701.96 59091.18 1.19 42.88 0.06 0.37 0.58 0.12 2005.21 0.09 177301.4 0.27
S.D. (66696.07) (111756.7) (0.40) (35.78) (0.15) (0.33) (0.38) (0.33) (6.59) (0.29) (294111.4) (0.35)
Observation 34 34 7 8 26 28 28 34 34 34 34 34
No Loans Mean 0.06 0.5 0.63 0.27 2005.94 0.06 1397831
S.D. (0.15) (0.34) (0.34) (0.44) (6.57) (0.24) (10600000)
Observation 329 390 453 630 604 630 459
Family, Relatives,
or Friends
 
Note: mean values, standard deviations, and the number of observations are presented in each cell. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. “Bank loan (Dummy)” 
represents whether a firm has any loan from a commercial bank. “Amount of loans when taken out (per loan)” represents the amount of a loan per loan when a firm borrows. 
“Interest rate of loan per month” represents the interest rate on an outstanding loan. “Duration of loan (months)” represents how long the maturity of an outstanding loan is. 
“Amount of outstanding loans” represents the amount of an outstanding loan. “ROA” represents profit over total assets. “Ratio of Sales in FX” represents the ratio of FX currency 
sales to total sales. “Ratio of Expenditure in FX” represents the ratio of FX expenditure to total expenditure. “Having insurance” is a dummy variable which takes one if a firm has 
business insurance. “Year of establishment” represents the age of a firm since it started operations. “Export (Dummy)” is a dummy variable which takes one if a firm is engaged in 
any exporting activities. “Amount of loans as a ratio of total assets” represents the amount of total loans held by a firm as a ratio of total assets. 
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Table 6: Results of Estimation of Determinants of Cambodian Firms’ Capital 
Structures 
Main Selection Main Selection Main Selection Main Selection
ROA 0.101 0.096 -0.032 0.030 -3.339* -3.347* -3.405* -3.281*
(0.17) (0.15) (-0.05) (0.04) (-1.90) (-1.91) (-1.93) (-1.68)
Ratio of FX Sales -0.379 1.305*** -0.366 1.294*** -0.772* 1.098** -0.761 1.095**
(-0.87) (2.78) (-0.84) (2.65) (-1.65) (2.16) (-1.64) (2.15)
ROA # Ratio of FX Sales 4.999** 5.552* 4.948** 5.285
(2.13) (1.96) (2.12) (1.62)
Volatility of Sales -0.216 0.609 -0.253 0.599 -0.346 0.452 -0.369 0.446
(-0.53) (1.54) (-0.61) (1.50) (-0.86) (1.12) (-0.91) (1.08)
Having insurance 0.739* -0.663 0.610 -0.672 0.815** -0.679 0.729* -0.706
(1.89) (-1.45) (1.45) (-1.41) (2.11) (-1.54) (1.65) (-1.46)
Ratio of Fixed Assets 1.433** 1.719*** 1.470** 1.743*** 1.252** 1.709*** 1.285** 1.728***
(2.33) (2.80) (2.39) (2.71) (2.06) (2.73) (2.10) (2.74)
Age 0.011 -0.017 0.009 -0.018 0.012 -0.018 0.011 -0.019
(0.55) (-0.81) (0.47) (-0.82) (0.64) (-0.87) (0.59) (-0.88)
Exporter Dummy 0.324 0.105 0.232 0.164
(0.83) (0.22) (0.57) (0.32)
Log. Total Assets 0.353** 0.362** 0.349** 0.354**
(2.56) (2.33) (2.33) (2.22)
Constant -3.551*** -5.676*** -3.546*** -5.782*** -3.094*** -5.285*** -3.099*** -5.355***
(-4.58) (-3.75) (-4.44) (-3.47) (-4.00) (-3.28) (-3.95) (-3.07)
athrho 1.678*** 1.606** 1.839** 1.781**
(2.58) (2.02) (2.37) (2.04)
lnsigma 0.169 0.156 0.153 0.145
(1.45) (1.18) (1.30) (1.12)
rho 0.933* 0.923* 0.951** 0.945**
Wald chi-squared (rho) 2.98 2.88 3.98 3.63
lambda 1.10 1.08 1.11 1.09
Wald chi-squared 16.13 16.81 21.32 21.82
Observations 114 114 114 114
Censored 38 38 38 38
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The values in 
parentheses represent the t-statistics. We estimated the models using the Heckman’s sample selection 
model with maximum likelihood estimation.  
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Figure 1： The Ratios of FX Currency in Corporate Loans (as of June 2013) 
 
Note: Data is provided by National Bank of Cambodia. This figure represents the ratio of FX corporate 
loans to total corporate loans. Commercial banks in this figure are listed from the largest bank on the 
left-hand side to smaller ones on the right-hand side. It appears that only one bank provides corporate 
loans in local currency.  
 
Figure 2: The Ratios of FX Revenue and FX Expenditure 
 
Note: The figure shows the ratio of FX currency in revenues and expenditures, 
respectively. The x-axis represents the ratio of FX currency in expenditure, and the 
y-axis represents the ratio of FX currency in revenues. 
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Table A1: Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Estimation  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) ROA 1
(2) Ratio of FX Sales 0.09 1.00
(3) Volatility of Sales 0.06 0.04 1.00
(4) exporter 0.20 0.15 0.15 1.00
(5) Having Insurance -0.06 0.31 0.09 0.37 1.00
(6) Ratio of Fixed Assets -0.03 -0.24 -0.22 -0.28 -0.33 1.00
(7) Log. Total Assets 0.19 0.44 0.19 0.38 0.47 -0.22 1.00
(8) Age 0.13 0.23 0.10 0.24 0.28 -0.17 0.40 1.00  
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Table A2: Results of Robust Estimation (Clustering Method) 
Main Selection
ROA -2.917*** -2.283
(-3.86) (-0.89)
Ratio of FX Sales -0.803*** 0.785
(-3.68) (1.21)
ROA # Ratio of FX Sales 4.330*** 3.193
(4.16) (0.68)
Volatility of Sales -0.656** 0.501**
(-2.15) (2.39)
Having insurance 0.666** -0.596
(2.35) (-0.99)
Ratio of Fixed Assets 1.001* 1.355*
(1.68) (1.84)
Age -0.014 -0.091*
(-0.07) (-1.86)
Exporter Dummy 0.289 -0.107
(1.20) (-0.31)
Log. Total Assets 0.435***
(3.10)
Constant -1.884*** -5.578***
(-2.62) (-2.69)
athrho 0.693*
(1.93)
lnsigma -0.026
(-0.17)
rho 0.600*
Wald chi-squared (rho) 3.71
lambda .584
Observations 114
Censored 38  
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Values in parentheses represent t-statistics. We estimated models using Heckman’s 
sample selection model with maximum likelihood estimation. Standard errors are 
calculated based on clustering method among industrial categories.  
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Appendix: Bank loans vs. loans from other sources 
To confirm robustness in the estimation results of equation 2 (selection equations in 
Table 6), we estimated equation 2 using the Probit model. Since a larger sample is available 
when we simply regress equation 2, then we can compare the main results with robust results. 
The results are presented in Table A3, and the estimated average marginal effects are shown. In 
column 1 and 2 of Table A3, we confirm the same results as seen in Table 6. The marginal effect 
of the ratio of FX in sales is significant in column 1 and 2, suggesting that if firms have larger 
shares of FX currency in sales, they are more likely to gain access to bank loans. Likewise, the 
marginal effect of the ratio of fixed assets is significantly positive. This suggests that if firms 
have more collateralizable assets, they are likely to gain access to bank loans. Given that the 
information asymmetry could be high in Cambodia, our results seem natural and suggest that, if 
firms have no collateral, they are likely to be excluded from the bank loan market.1   
  
Table A3: Results of Probit Estimation of Access to Bank Loans 
 
In column 3 and 4 of Table A1, we also present the results of Probit estimation of the 
determinants of whether firms choose bank loans or no loans. We find no significance in the 
effect of the ratio of FX sales and the ratio of fixed assets, which are different from the results in 
Table 6. This result could be due to the bias resulting from the inclusion of firms that have no 
demand for loans. Cole and Sokolyk (2016) argue that firms with no loans could be categorized 
into two types: firms that are in need of loans but could not gain access to borrowings, and firms 
that have no demand for borrowings. The authors empirically demonstrate that the fundamentals 
of these two types of firms are statistically different. As discussed by Cole and Sokolyk, our 
                                            
1 The results indicate both possible cases where firms are discouraged from applying for bank loans and 
where they are actually rejected by banks. 
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results from column 3 and 4 might be a consequence of this potential bias from the firms with no 
demand for loans. 
Next, we analyzed the determinants of firms’ choice of funding sources using the 
multi-logit estimation. We categorized firms into three types; (1) firms having bank loans, (2) 
firms having loans from MFIs or kinship networks, and (3) firms with no loans; we then set the 
firms with having bank loans as the baseline in this multi-logit model. The results are presented 
in Table A4. Mostly, we confirmed similar results as seen in Table A3. We found that the size of 
firms increases the probability of having bank loans, while the volatility of sales also increases 
the probability of having bank loans. Furthermore, the increase in the ratio of FX revenues leads 
to decrease in probability of having loans from MFI or kinship networks. It is possibly because 
firms with FX revenues did not incur currency mismatch risks, and could easily gain access to 
bank loans.   
 
Table A4: Results of Multi-Logit estimation of Access to Bank Loans 
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Table A3: Results of Probit Estimation of Access to Bank Loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA 0.090 0.094 -0.011 -0.022
(1.11) (1.17) (-0.15) (-0.29)
Ratio of FX Sales 0.179* 0.181* 0.068 0.060
(1.65) (1.67) (1.21) (1.07)
Volatility of Sales 0.517 0.518 0.464** 0.459**
(1.39) (1.38) (2.49) (2.47)
Having Insurance -0.039 -0.038 -0.076 -0.075
(-0.35) (-0.35) (-1.47) (-1.46)
Ratio of Fixed Assets 0.299* 0.292* 0.071 0.080
(1.93) (1.88) (1.05) (1.16)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.0017 -0.002
(-0.51) (-0.48) (-0.72) (-0.83)
Log. Total Assets 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.040*** 0.037***
(3.57) (3.58) (3.33) (2.99)
Exporter -0.0551 0.0575
(-0.52) (1.02)
(-3.78) (-3.75) (-6.36) (-5.92)
Observations 152 152 434 434
Pseud-R-squared 0.1791 0.1805 0.0959 0.0986
Firms Bank Loans
vs
Firms with No Loans
Firms with Bank Loans
 vs
Firms with MFIs/Family/Relative
Loans
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The values in 
parentheses represent the t-statistics. 
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Table A4: Results of Multi-Logit Estimation of Access to Bank Loans 
(1) (2)
ROA -0.07 -0.05 0.12 -0.06 -0.06 0.12
(0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Ratio of FX Sales 0.03 -0.07 * 0.04 0.04 -0.08 * 0.03
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
Volatility of Sales -0.61 ** -0.03 0.64 *** -0.60 ** -0.04 0.64 ***
(0.13) (0.22) (0.24) (0.13) (0.22)
Having Insurance 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
Ratio of Fixed Assets 0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.07
(0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log. Total Assets -0.05 *** -0.01 0.06 *** -0.04 *** -0.02 * 0.06 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Exporter -0.10 0.05 0.06
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
MFIs/Relative
Loans Bank loan
(0.24)
No loans
MFIs/Relative
Loans Bank loan No loans
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The values in 
parentheses represent the standard errors. 
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Abstruct (in Japanese) 
要約 
 
本稿では、カンボジアという極度にドル化した経済での企業の資本構成の決定要因
を実証的に分析した。具体的には、先進国企業の資本構成の決定要因としてよく使わ
れるトレードオフ理論、エージェンシーコスト理論、ペッキングオーダー理論といっ
た標準的な理論でカンボジア企業の資本構成の説明ができるかどうかの実証分析とと
もに、ドル化経済特有の通貨ミスマッチリスクの影響が見られるかどうかの実証分析
を行った。実証分析では、カンボジア中央銀行（National Bank of Cambodia）と JICA
研究所が共同研究として 2014年に調査した 856社の企業のデータのうちの負債を所有
している企業 223 社を対象に実証分析を行った。特に、実証分析では銀行負債比率を
被説明変数とした上で、開発途上国でしばしば問題となる外部負債へのアクセスの制
約によるセレクションバイアスに対応するため、サンプルセレクションモデルを用い
た推定を行った。 
サーベイの結果を見ると、カンボジア企業の主要な借入先は商業銀行であり、かつ
商業銀行からの借入はすべてが USドルとなっていることから、カンボジア企業の資金
調達は USドルによる借入に限定されていることが明らかになった。さらに回帰分析の
結果、資本構成の決定に関して、固定資産比率が高くなるほど銀行負債比率が高くな
ること、また、事業リスクに対する保険を所有している場合、銀行負債比率が高くな
ることが示された。そして、自国通貨建ての借入が利用できないほど金融取引が高度
にドル化した経済に特有の要因として、通貨ミスマッチリスクが銀行負債の総資産比
率に影響を与えているという結果も見られた。特に、収益率が高い企業ほど、収入の
うちの外貨比率の上昇に対し銀行負債比率を低くする傾向が有意にみられた。これは、
内部資金が潤沢な企業ほど通貨ミスマッチリスクに敏感に反応し通貨ミスマッチリス
クを抑える行動をとっていること示唆する結果といえる。 
これらの実証結果から、ほかの開発途上国で見られるようにカンボジアの企業の資
金調達では担保となりうる資産があるかどうか、また、倒産リスクの程度が重要な要
因であることが考えられる。そして、カンボジアのような金融取引が高度にドル化し
た経済では自国通貨建ての借入が利用できないため、自国通貨建ての収入を持つ企業
の為替リスクのヘッジ手段が限定的になっていることが企業の資金調達において制約
として働いていることが考えられる。そのため、例えば自国通貨建てのローン市場の
拡充といった自国通貨の促進政策はカンボジア企業の資金調達におけるリスクを緩和
し、企業の資金調達の促進につながることが期待できるだろう。 
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